Abstract. The paper addresses the problem of bad signature identication in batch veri cation of digital signatures. The number of generic tests necessary to identify all bad signatures in a batch instance, is used to measure the e ciency of veri ers. The divide-and-conquer verier DCV (x; n) is de ned. The veri er identi es all bad signatures in a batch instance x of the length n by repeatedly splitting the input into sub-instances. Its properties are investigated. In particular, probability distributions for the number of generic tests necessary to identify one, two and three bad signatures, are derived. The average numbers of GT tests necessary to identify bad signatures ranging from 1 to 16 are obtained from computer simulation. Further, a Hamming veri er (HV) is de ned which allows to identify a single bad signature in a batch of the length n = 2 k 1 using k + 2 tests. HV is generalised into the two-layer Hamming veri er (2HV). Given a batch instance of the length 2 k 2, the 2HV veri er identi es a single bad signature using k + 2 tests and two bad signatures in expense of 3k + 3 tests. The work is concluded by comments about a general model for veri cation codes identifying t bad signatures and the design of veri ers using combinatorial structures.
Introduction
Digital signatures are main cryptographic tools for message authentication. Unlike hand-written signatures, digital ones di er from one document to another as they produce a ngerprint which re ects both the identity of signer (or more precisely their secret signing key) and the contents of the document (typically embedded in its digest). Any digital signature includes signing and veri cation algorithms. The signing algorithm can be run by the holder of the secret signing key. The veri cation algorithm can be run by everybody as the matching (veri cation) key is public.
Often a signature is generated once but its veri cation is done many times. A growing usage of digital signatures for electronic payment systems stresses the need for streamlining of the signature veri cation. Batch veri cation o ers an e cient veri cation of a collection of related signatures at a cost of making a mistake. The probability of mistake can be traded o with the e ciency. Batch veri cation is an option if the signature used exhibits the homomorphic property.
The idea of batch veri cation was spelt out in many papers 2,4, 6,8].
Motivation
Undoubtedly, fast signature veri cation seems to be of utmost importance when there is a need for continual processing of many signatures. As shown by Bellare, Garay and Rabin in 1] there are three generic test which can be used for fast batch veri cation of signatures. E ciency of these tests varies and depends on the size of a signature batch being veri ed. The main problem with batch veri cation is that they trade e ciency with security. In the case of individual signature veri cation, an attacker is forced to break the underlying signature scheme if they want to generate a valid signature for a message. In the case when the batch veri cation is applied, the attacker may also explore weaknesses existing in the veri cation tests. Veri cation tests are probabilistic algorithms for which it is possible to set the bound on the probability of acceptance of invalid signatures in the batch tested. As there is a direct relation between the probability and e ciency, one can expect that the probability may be lowered during the time when the heavy processing is expected (typically, the end of the week). Instead of breaking the underlying signature, attackers are encouraged to generate messages with invalid signatures on a massive scale. This serves two purposes. The rst purpose is to increase the veri cation load, and one can expect that the manager responsible for veri cation of signatures, will lower the threshold probability even further. The second purpose is to increase the probability of attacker success. On the top of this, the attacker may have speci c knowledge about which test will be used and what parameters are employed. This knowledge may give some hints as to how invalid signatures could be produced to maximise the chance of slipping through the tests. When a collection of signatures passes the tests, the veri er accepts all the signatures as valid. Otherwise, the collection is rejected. Now the veri er must separate the valid signatures from invalid ones. In this paper, we consider different methods of invalid signature identi cation and evaluate e ciency of tests with invalid signature identi cation.
Background
There are two homomorphic operations widely used for signing: modular exponentiation (the base is xed) and RSA exponentiation (the exponent is xed). Consider modular exponentiation de ned for a cyclic group of order q, where g is the cyclic group generator. The DSA or DSS signatures and their versions are signatures of this kind. Being more precise, the exponents are computed individually for each signature. This computation is cheap { it takes one modular inversion and multiplication. The nal veri cation can be done in batches in which exponents are added (see 5]).
Given a batch x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )) of messages with their signatures, signatures can be veri ed one by one by checking g mi ? = s i for i = 1; : : :; n
The cost of veri cation is n exponentiations. To reduce the number of expensive exponentiations and speed up the veri cation process, one can verify the following
This costs one exponentiation, n 1 modular multiplications, and n 1 modular additions. Typically, the calculation of P n i=1 m i is done modulo q while Q n i=1 s i is performed modulo p where q divides p 1.
Consider the RSA exponentiation where the modulus N is the product of two primes p and q. The signer secret key is d and the public veri cation key is e. All signed messages are smaller than the modulus N. A typical batch of signatures looks like ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )). Sequential veri cation of the batch s e i ? = m i for i = 1; : : :; n; takes n exponentiations. Again, the veri cation process can be sped up by using
This takes one exponentiation and 2(n 1) modular multiplications.
In general, a batch veri er is a probabilistic algorithm B which takes a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )) and a security parameter`. The algorithm { outputs \0" always whenever all the signatures in the batch are correct, { outputs \1" with probability 1 2 `w henever the batch contains incorrect signatures. A batch veri er never makes mistakes when the batch is \clean". If the batch is \dirty" or contains incorrect signatures, then the batch veri er makes mistakes with probability 2 `.
There is a universal test which is applicable for any signature scheme which has a homomorphic property. The test (in 1] called random subset test) is de ned as follows.
De nition 1. Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )) and a security parameter`. The universal test (UT) takes`rounds. For each round 1. pick a random set T = ft 1 ; : : :; t n g, i.e. each t i is selected independently and with the same probability from f0; 1g, 2. create a subset x T = f(m i ; s i )jt i = 1g, 3 . run the test V (x T ) (either V g (x T ) or V e (x T )). If the test accepts go to the next round. Otherwise, reject the batch.
A useful test for signatures based on a xed base applies a random string of small integers used in the test as exponents (in 8] called small exponents test).
De nition 2. Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )) and a security parameter`. The small exponent (SE) test:
1. select at random a collection of small integers e = (e 1 ; : : :; e n ) where e i < 2`, 2. convert the instance x into x e = ((m 1 e 1 ; s e1 1 ); : : :; (m n e n ; s en n )), 3 . run the test V g (x 0 ). If the batch instance x 0 passes the test accept x otherwise reject.
Clearly, we are interested in a generic test which always succeed when all signatures are valid and fails with an overwhelming probability when there is one or more bad signatures.
De nition 3. Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )). The generic test (GT) takes a batch instance x and 1. outputs \0" whenever all signatures are valid. The test never makes mistakes for this case, 2. returns \1" whenever there is at least one bad signature. In this case the test makes mistakes with probability 2 `. If a batch of signatures passes tests, then the veri er accepts the whole batch. The probability of mistake can be make small enough say smaller than 2 100 . However when a batch fails a test, the veri er is not able to reject all signatures in the batch. The veri er faces the problem of identi cation of bad signatures. Let us consider some possible solutions for bad signature identi cation.
The simplest solution for it could be based on testing all signatures one by one using the GT test.
De nition 4. Naive Veri er. Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )).
1. Run GT(x; n). If GT(x; n)=0, accept the instance x and exit. Otherwise, when GT(x; n)=1, for i = 1 to i = n do: { apply GT(x i ; 1), { if GT(x i ; 1) = 1 then store x i otherwise go for the next i.
Output all stored signatures in the list NV(x).
where x i = (m i ; s i ).
The well-known twelve-coin problem is very much related to the identi cation of bad signatures. It can be formulated as follows.
Given 12 coins all of equal weight, except one defective coin. It is not known whether the defective coin is lighter or heavier than each of the others. Assume that there is a set of two-dish scales which can be used to carry out tests. Coins can be placed on both sides and if the weights are equal then the scales balance, otherwise they tilt downwards on the side carrying the heavier weight. Find a sequence of tests which can be performed using the scales to identify the defective coin within the three weightings only. Note that identi cation of a bad signature resembles the twelve-coin problem. The main di erence is that tests performed on batches do not allow us to see how the scales tilt. In other words, the tests carried out on batches allow us to see whether the batch is clean (the scales balance) or dirty (the scales do not balance).
Divide-and-Conquer Veri ers
Identi cation of bad signatures can be implemented by the so called divide-andconquer (DC) veri er. The idea seems to be straightforward and can be traced in the literature under the name \cut and choose" 4].
The veri er is an algorithm which takes a batch instance x and outputs either \0" when the batch instance is clean otherwise returns a list of all bad signatures. It is de ned as a recursive function.
De nition 5. DC Veri er. Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )) with n = 2 k signatures. 
where indicates that the DCV veri er slices input instances into subinstances of the same length and n is the length of the input batch instance. From Equation (3), it is easy to observe that for very badly contaminated instances, the selection of a large is preferred. Note that if = n = 2 k , then the DCV veri er becomes the NV veri er which always consumes n + 1 tests.
Degree of Contamination Versus Parameter
It is an interesting to ask about the degree of contamination of batch instances for which the naive veri er becomes more e cient than DCV 2 . This is an important issue for e cient signature veri cation. To answer this question, assume that a batch instance consists of n = 2 k signatures contaminated with t = 2 r bad signatures (r < k). Denote the maximum numbers of GT tests necessary to identify all t bad signatures out of total n ones using the NV and DCV 2 veri ers by # max(NV; n; t) and # max(DCV 2 ; n; t), respectively.
Note that the worst case occurs when the DC veri er after the r-th recursive step all sub-instances contain precisely one bad signature. To get to this point, DCV 2 consumes precisely 2 r 1 tests. So # max(DCV 2 ; 2 k ; t) = 2 r 1 + 2 r # max(DCV 2 ; 2 k r ; 1): A single bad signature in a batch instance of size 2 k r is always identi able using 2(k r) + 1 tests. Therefore, we obtain # max(DCV 2 ; 2 k ; t) = 2 r+1 (k r + 1) 1: Now we can ask how small the contamination of a batch instance should be to render the DCV veri er more e cient or # max(DCV 2 ; 2 k ; t) < # max(NV; 2 k ; t): If we substitute values obtained, then the inequality becomes 2 (r+1) (k r + 1) 1 < 2 k + 1 or equivalently k r + 1 < 2 k r 1 + 2 r : It is easy to check that this inequality holds for any k r 3. So we have proved the corollary. Corollary 1. DCV 2 is more e cient (consumes less GT tests) from the NV veri er if batch instances of 2 k signatures contain less than 2 k 3 bad ones.
Note that we have compared DCV 2 (binary split of batch instances) with DCV n (equivalent to NV). Similar considerations can be made for any two veriers DCV , DCV for 6 = . This makes sense if the contamination varies and the parameter can be adjusted accordingly.
Results of computer simulation conducted to determine the relation between the degree of contamination and the parameter are summarised in Table 1 
Number of Tests Needed to Identify t Bad Signatures
Denote #(DCV ; n; t) to be the number of GT tests necessary to identify bad signatures from a batch instance with n signatures provided t ones are bad. As the DCV veri er is probabilistic in its nature, the number #(DCV ; n; t) is in fact a random variable. To simplify our notation, let N (t; n) = #(DCV ; n; t):
Our aim is to derive the probability distribution for the variable N 2 (t; n). Consider the veri er DCV 2 and the corresponding random variable N 2 (t; n). Let t = 1. Obviously, the veri er needs to perform 2k + 1 tests, i.e. N 2 (1; 2 k ) = 2k + 1: This number of tests is constant and occurs with probability 1. By the way, the number of tests can be cut almost by half if t = 1 is known before hand as N 2 (1; 2 k ) = k + 1. This observation of course may be used for optimisation of the DCV veri er. This is especially e ective for = 2. If a sub-instance passes the GT test, the second sub-instance is not tested (as it must fail it anyway). Instead, it is divided into halves and one of the resulting sub-instances is tested.
Let t = 2. Note that random variable N 2 (2; 2 k ) can be expressed by random variables N 2 (2; 2 k 1 ) and N 2 (1; 2 k 1 ) according to the following equation: N 2 (2; 2 k ) = 1 + 2N 2 (1; 2 k 1 ) with probability p 1;0 2 + N 2 (2; 2 k 1 ) with probability p 2;0 (4)
Similarly, we can write N 2 (2; 2 k 1 ) = 1 + 2N 2 (1; 2 k 2 ) with probability p 1;1 2 + N 2 (2; 2 k 2 ) with probability p 2;1 (5)
For i = 2; : : :; k 1, we can generalise as N 2 (2; 2 k i ) = 1 + 2N 2 (1; 2 k i 1 ) with probability p 1;i 2 + N 2 (2; 2 k i 1 ) with probability p 2;i (6) Assume that at step j, two bad signatures clustered together in a single instance have been put into two di erent sub-instances. This means that the bad signatures were placed in the same instance j times in a row. Therefore N 2 (2; 2 k )(j) = 2j + 1 + 2N 2 (1; 2 k j 1 ) = 4k 2j 1 (7) where j = 0; 1; : : :; k 1. Now we are ready to calculate probabilities p i;j . The parameter n = 2 k . The probability p 1;0 expresses the probability that the initial batch instance splits into two sub-instances containing one bad signature each so Similarly, the probability that after the split, one of the sub-instances contains two bad signatures is:
The multiplier 2 indicates the fact that two bad signatures can be in the rst or the second sub-instance. Continuing our calculations, we obtain p 1;i = n 2(n 2 i )
The probability p(j) that for some step j, two bad signatures have been placed into two di erent sub-instances is: p(0) = p 1;0 p(1) = p 2;0 p 1;1 . . . p(j) = p 2;0 p 2;1 : : : p 2;j 1 p 1;j After substituting values, the above equation takes on the following form: p(j) = n n 1 1 2 j+1 for j = 0; : : :; k 1 and n = 2 k . So we have proved the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Given the DCV veri er with = 2. If a batch instance of length n = 2 k is contaminated by two bad signatures, then the number N 2 (2; n) of necessary GT tests is a random variable whose probability distribution is as follows: P(N 2 (2; n) = 4k 2j 1) = n n 1 1 2 j+1
(10) for j = 0; 1; : : :; k 1. Now we derive the probability distribution for the required number of GT tests when the input batch instance is contaminated by three bad signatures (t = 3).
The number of GT tests is denoted by N 2 (3; 2 k ). The number of tests satis es the equation N 2 (3; 2 k ) = 1 + N 2 (1; 2 k 1 ) + N 2 (2; 2 k 1 ) with probability p 1 2 + N 2 (3; 2 k 1 ) with probability p 2 It means that after the rst step, the veri er may split the input instance into two sub-instances where (1) one sub-instance contains one bad signature and the other sub-instance is contaminated by two bad signatures, (2) one sub-instance is clean and the other includes 3 bad signatures. The probability p 1 is equal to Assuming that the bad signatures have been tossed into two sub-instances at the rst step by the veri er, then the probability distribution can be derived from previous considerations (see Equation 8 ) and P (N 2 (3; n) = 6k 2j 5j(1; 2)) = p 1 p 1;1 = 3n 4(n 1) n (n 2) 1 2 j+1 for j = 0; 1; : : :; k 2.
Consider the case when bad signatures have been tossed into the same subinstance (the other sub-instance is clean) { the case (0,3). Assume that for certain step i, the three bad signatures have been split into either (1,2) or (2,1). It means also that three bad signatures were tossed together i times so N 2 (3; n) = 2i + 1 + N 2 (1; 2 k i 1 ) + N 2 (2; 2 k r 1 ) for i = 0; : : :; k 1. After substituting the expressions obtained for t = 2 and t = 1, we obtain nal probability distribution.
Corollary 3. Given the veri er DCV with = 2. If a batch instance of length n = 2 k is contaminated by three bad signatures, then the number N 2 (3; n) of required GT tests is a random variable whose probability distribution is as follows: P (N 2 (3; n) = 6k 4i 2j 5) = 3n 2 (n 1)(n 2) 1 2 2i+j+3 n 2 i+1 n 2 k i 1 (11) for i = 0; 1; : : :; k 1 and j = 0; 1; : : :; k i 2.
Knowing the probability distributions for the number of GT tests necessary to identify bad signatures in the cases when t = 1; 2; 3, it is easy to nd the average number of test. For the number of bad signatures t > 3, the average can be estimated using computer simulation. The results are compiled in Table 2 .
Optimisation of DC Veri ers
As observed above, for DCV 2 , the number of GT tests can be reduced if the veri er knows the precise number of bad signatures. If there is only a single bad signature (t = 1), then at each step the DCV 2 veri er needs to tests only single sub-instance out of two generated from the contaminated instance. If the sub-instance is clean, then the other sub-instance is dirty (and vice versa). So the number N 2 (1; 2 k ) = 2k + 1 can be reduced to k + 1. Even if the number of bad signatures is not known before hand, this observation can be exploited to reduce the number of GT tests. )k + 1) tests instead of ( k + 1) assuming a single bad signature and the length of batch instance k .
Further improvement can be achieved if the split of instances is not random. It turns out that if the random split into sub-instances is replaced by deterministic split into sub-instances, then the number N (t; n) preserve the same probability distribution assuming that the input batch instance is random. This assumption seems to hold in most practical situations.
Additionally, the DCV veri er can be sped up by a careful design of the GT test. To illustrate the point assume that the DCV veri er is used to identify bad signatures by running the test V e (x) de ned by Equation (2) . Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )). Note that the test V e (x) is run for the whole instance x and needs to produce the product of all messages ( Q n i=1 m i ) and all signatures ( Q n i=1 s i ). Before calling the veri er, we can create two multiplication tables for messages and signatures. For instance, the message multiplication table is of the following form (the input instance is of length 16):
Batch Instance: 1; 2; 3; 4; 5;6; 7;8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16 1-st level of products: (1; 2)(3; 4)(5; 6)(7; 8)(9; 10)(11; 12)(13; 14)(15; 16) 2-nd level of products: (1; 2; 3; 4)(5; 6; 7; 8)(9; 10; 11; 12)(13;14;15;16) 3-rd level of products: (1; 2; 3; 4; 5;6;7; 8)(9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16) 4-th level of products: (1; 2; 3; 4; 5;6; 7; 8; 9;10;11;12; 13; 14; 15; 16): where (i; j) stands for the product of m i m j . All multiplications needed by the DCV veri er are already stored in the tables. To run the test V e (x), it needs to perform a single exponentiation.
Veri ers Based on Hamming Codes
Assume that batch instances are contaminated by at most a single bad signature. This assumption is true most of the time when the source of errors is unreliable storage or communication so from time to time some signatures (or corresponding messages) get corrupted. Given a batch instance x = ((m 1 ; s 1 ); : : :; (m n ; s n )) of length n = 2 k 1 for some positive k. To identify a single bad signature, it is enough to design a Hamming code with the block length n and k parity check equations. Let H be a parity check matrix. H contains k rows and n columns. (m n ; s n )) of length n = 2 k 1 for some positive k.
